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Policing the Genuine Purity of Blood: 
The EU Commission’s Assault on Citizenship 
and Residence by Investment and the Future 
of Citizenship in the European Union
Abstract
This article provides a brief critical assessment of the European Com-
mission’s January 2019 “Report on Investor Citizenship and Residence 
Schemes in the European Union”. Since it is the fi rst detailed document 
by the Commission outlining this institution’s position on the matters 
of investment residence and citizenship, and given the Commission’s re-
cently articulated intentions to take Cyprus and Malta to Court over their 
investment migration law and practice, the Report in question is of para-
mount importance. The document sets the legal-political context of the 
regulation of the migration of wealthy third-country nationals in Europe. 
It is also deeply fl awed. Rather that summarising the document, this ar-
ticle focuses on fi ve core defi ciencies of the Commission’s embarrassing 
product and demonstrates how the Commission failed to get the EU’s own 
law right, in addition to showing a poor understanding of international 
law on the matter. Ripe with nationalist assumptions not rooted in the 
Treaties or the secondary law of the Union and showcasing a timid, convo-
luted and inconsistent analysis of the issues it purports to address, the Re-
port has unsurprisingly failed to change the landscape of regulation in the 
fi eld of investment citizenship and residence in the EU or anywhere else 
in the world. What it did make clear, however, was that the mere political 
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suspicion of a particular type of naturalisation is enough for the European 
Commission to set aside the law and misinform the public, underlying 
once again the problematic tension between the growing political nature 
of this institution and its key task as guardian of the Treaties. There is 
a burning need for the Commission to take a more careful, coherent and 
informed approach to its actions, an approach indispensable for the pres-
ervation of the rule of law in the Union.
Keywords: CBI, RBI, Investment Migration, Citizenship by Investment, 
Rule of Law
Introduction: Citizenship Law and the Moral Panics 
of Innate “Native” Superiority
Not only are the refugees and asylum seekers “fl ooding Europe” rou-
tinely demonised and subjected to intense prejudices.1 Millionaires can 
also be a problem for “Fortress Europe”, especially if they “buy” the sa-
cred privileges of Europeanness, instead of winning them in the “birth-
right lottery”2 or “earning” them by humbly waiting and enduring routine 
humiliation like all the other ‘others’ whom the European Union (EU) is 
carefully calibrated to keep at bay.3 Being vocal about the absoluteness of 
‘native’ superiority can be extremely costly, however, as the marketisation 
of citizenship and residence can bring billions of euros to the Member 
States’ crisis-stricken budgets.4 This dilemma lies at the core of the on-
going debate surrounding the phenomenon of investment migration in 
1  On the attitudes to refugees in Europe, see e.g. K. Bansak, J. Hainmueller and 
D. Hangartner, How Economic, Humanitarian, and Religious Concerns Shape European 
Attitudes toward Asylum Seekers, “Science”, no. 354 (6309)/2016, p. 217. 
2  A. Shachar, The Birthright Lottery, Cambridge MA 2009.
3  On the problematic ideology of “integration”, see e.g. S. Ganty, L’intégration des 
citoyens européens et des ressortissants de pays tiers en droit de l’Union européenne. Critique 
d’une intégration choisie, Paris 2021. It is worth keeping in mind that the EU is the only 
advanced constitutional system in the world, where third country nationals are not 
entitled to benefi t from any of the core rights offered to citizens, including, especially, 
being part of the EU’s internal market. EU law is thus the only law in the world el-
evating nationality discrimination to the absolute: without the ‘right’ nationality the 
EU disappears as a territory and as a horizon of opportunities: D. Kochenov, M. van 
den Brink, Pretending There Is No Union: Non-Derivative Quasi-Citizenship Rights of 
Third-Country Nationals in the EU, in: Degrees of Free Movement and Citizenship, eds. 
D. Thym, M. Zoetewij-Turhan, Leiden 2015, p. 66.
4  J. Lindeboom, S. Meunier, Foreign Direct Investment and Investment Migration 
Programmes in the European Union, in: Citizenship and Residence Sales: Rethinking the 
Boundaries of Belonging, eds. D. Kochenov, K. Surak, Cambridge 2021 (forthcoming).
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Europe.5 In this article I focus precisely on this dilemma and the moral 
panic it provokes: if EU citizenship is sacred and rooted in the native 
possession of pure European blood providing a “genuine link” to Europe, 
how come someone can buy it, thus foregoing the necessary humiliation 
of ordinary naturalization? As we will see, the European Commission had 
a lot to say on this matter in its 2019 “Report on Investment Citizenship 
and Residence Schemes in the European Union”6 – and proved willing to 
sacrifi ce the free movement of persons in the internal market and the basic 
principles fl owing from the key Court of Justice of the European Union 
(ECJ) case law in this area, on the altar of the obscurantist nativism that 
the EU was precisely designed to destroy by outlawing discrimination on 
the basis of nationality.7 In outlining fi ve core fl aws of the Commission’s 
Report, this article is in full agreement with Ulli Jessurun d’Oliveira’s 
analysis:8 Member State competence on the matter of granting citizen-
ship reigns supreme unless they start deploying nationalist ideologies of 
citizenship in order to humiliate Europeans and deprive them of rights 
related to the citizenship status, which are provided by EU law. Moreo-
ver, as Martijn van den Brink has convincingly argued, EU law cannot 
be deployed to enforce any “genuine link” requirements9 – that without 
defeating the purpose of EU citizenship, as will be analysed also below. 
Consequently, the Commission needs to be more humble to do less harm 
in this fundamentally important fi eld. What we can observe, however, is 
the exact opposite of humbleness, as the Commission deployed the fl awed 
reasoning of its 2019 Report dissected below as a base for a direct action 
against Cyprus and Malta, communicated on 20 October 2020.10
5  For an in-depth analysis, see: Citizenship and Residence Sales: Rethinking the 
Boundaries of Belonging, eds. D. Kochenov, K. Surak, Cambridge 2021 (forthcoming).
6  European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parlia-
ment, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee of the Regions 
COM(2019) 12 fi nal. Cf. Questions and Answers on the Report on Investor Citizen-
ship and Residence Schemes in the European Union, https://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-19-527_en.htm (access 1.08.2020).
7  W. Maas, Creating European Citizens, Boston 2007; G. Davies, Nationality Dis-
crimination in the Internal Market, The Hague 2003. Cf. J.H.H. Weiler, Europe: The Case 
against the Case of Statehood, “European Law Journal”, no. 4/1998, p. 61.
8  H.U. Jessurun d’Oliveira, Union Citizenship and beyond, in: European Citizenship 
under Stress: Social Justice, Brexit, and Other Challenges, eds. N. Cambien, D. Kochenov, 
E. Muir, Boston 2020.
9  M. van den Brink, Revising Citizenship within the European Union: Is a Genuine 
Link Requirement the Way Forward?, “EUI Working Papers” RSCAS, no. 76/2020, p. 17.
10  European Commission (press release), Investor Citizenship Schemes: European 
Commission Opens Infringements against Cyprus and Malta for “Selling” EU Citi-
zenship, Brussels, 20 Oct. 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/
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Alongside the UK with its Tier 1 visa,11 the US with its EB-512 and 
formerly Canada,13 the EU is among the world leaders in investment 
migration,14 reaping the benefi ts of the desire of wealthy people around 
the world either to establish themselves in the EU, or to acquire EU citi-
zenship, which is of much higher quality than the majority of world na-
tionalities.15 Every year a handful of billionaires and thousands of mil-
lionaires acquire citizenship and residence through investment or dona-
tion on both sides of the Atlantic.16 A whole industry has emerged around 
this, as it has around other areas of migration and modes of citizenship 
acquisition.17 A small but opinionated body of moral panic literature has 
also mushroomed around the issues of whether citizenship – a randomly 
en/ip_20_1925. For brief analyses, see: Investment Migration Insider interview with Dim-
itry Kochenov, D. Kochenov: Commission Would Likely Be “Humiliated”, If CIP-Matter 
Goes to Court over “Genuine Links”, “Investment Migration Insider”, 23 Oct. 2020, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3718328 (access 18.12.2020); 
M. van den Brink, Investor Citizenship and EU Law: Much to Do about Nothing ?, Glo-
balCit blog, 30 Oct. 2020, https://globalcit.eu/investor-citizenship-and-eu-law-much-
to-do-about-nothing/ (access 18.12.2020).
11  M. Sumption, K. Hooper, Selling Visas and Citizenship: Policy Questions from the 
Global Boom in Investor Immigration, Washington DC 2014. Cf. Transparency Interna-
tional UK, Gold Rush, London 2015; A. Tryfonidou, Investment Residence in the UK: 
Past and Future, “Investment Migration Policy Brief ”, no. 1/2017.
12  L.K.L. Thiele, S.T. Decker, Residence in the United States through Investment: Re-
ality or Chimera, “Albany Government Law Review”, no. 3/2010, p. 103; E.C. Kendall, 
Green Cards as the Ultimate Dividends: Why Improving the US Investment Visa Program 
Will Encourage the Economic Recovery by Increasing Foreign Investment and Creating Jobs 
for Americans, “Georgetown Immigration Law Journal”, no. 27/2013, p. 580.
13  M. Cohen, The Re-Invention of Investment Immigration in Canada and Construc-
tions of Canadian Citizenship, “Investment Migration Research Papers”, no. 2/2017.
14  Cf. C. Kälin, Ius Doni, in: International and European Law, Brill-Nijhoff 2019; 
K. Surak, Citizenship 4 Sale, Cambridge MA 2021 (forthcoming), Cf. Citizenship and 
Residence Sales: Rethinking…, op. cit.
15  D. Kochenov, J. Lindeboom, Empirical Assessment of the Quality of Nationalities, 
“European Journal of Law and Governance”, no. 4/2017, p. 314.
16  Cf. e.g. A. Solimano, Global Mobility of the Wealthy and Their Assets: An Overview, 
”Investment Migration Research Papers”, no. 2/2018; V. Popov, Why Some Countries 
Have More Billionaires than Others? Explaining Variety in the Billionaire Intensity of GDP, 
”Investment Migration Research Papers”, no. 3/2018.
17  K. Surak, Global Citizenship 2.0 – The Growth of Citizenship by Investment Pro-
grammes, “Investment Migration Research Papers”, no. 3/2016. In other fi elds special-
ized agencies help persons with low-quality citizenships to learn the relevant lan-
guages for the upgrade of the personal legal status; trace the necessary documents to 
establish the “right” ancestry leading to a European document, or facilitating giving 
birth abroad in the ius soli jurisdictions offering high-quality nationalities: Y. Harpaz, 
Citizenship 2.0: Dual Nationality as a Global Asset, Princeton 2019. 
37
D.V. Kochenov, Commission’s Assault on Citizenship by Investment
allocated status of totalitarian domination18 should be “for sale”.19 Natu-
ralisation through investment has even been compared to the “passport 
trade”,20 a trade which does not exist, strictly speaking, outside of the 
clandestine Pacifi c passport markets21 and other criminal circles provid-
ing counterfeited offi cial documents.22 Nonetheless, distributing citizen-
ship – an arbitrarily assigned and commonly inherited legal status best 
compared to feudal privilege23 – through this particular route has been 
loudly pronounced non-kosher, immoral, if not illegal, by scholars and 
politicians alike.24 The Commission, with its 2019 Report and the 20 Oc-
tober 2020 action against Malta and Cyprus, has joined this high morality 
camp demonstrating what Carl Baudenbacher characterised as “fragwür-
dige Aktionismus”.25
Pronouncements of “immorality” of citizenship “sales” do not con-
stitute the only available approach to understanding the issue of invest-
18  D. Kochenov, Citizenship, Cambridge MA 2019.
19  A. Shachar, Dangerous Liasons: Money and Citizenship, in: Debating Transfor-
mations of National Citizenship, ed. R. Bauböck, Berlin 2018, p. 7; A Tanasoca, Citi-
zenship for Sale: Neomedieval Not Just Neoliberal, “European Journal of Sociology”, 
no. 57/2016, p. 169. Cf. also J. Džankić’s writings on this matter.
20  See, e.g. D. Kochenov, “Passport Trade”: The Vicious Circle of Nonesense in the 
Netherlands, Verfassungsblog, 8 June 2020, https://verfassungsblog.de/passport-trade-
a-vicious-cycle-of-nonsense-in-the-netherlands/ (access 1.08.2020).
21  A. Van Fossen, Citizenship for Sale: Passports of Convenience from Pacifi c Island 
Tax Havens, “Commonwealth and Comparative Politics”, no. 45/2007, p. 138.
22  G. Gotev, Thousands obtained EU citizenship for €5000 in Bulgarian scam, “Eu-
ractiv”, 30 October 2018, www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/thou-
sands-obtained-eu-citizenship-for-e5000-in-bulgarian-scam/ (access 21.06.2020).
23  J. Carens, The Ethics of Immigration, Oxford 2013; J. Carens, Aliens and Citizens: 
The Case for Open Borders, “Review of Politics”, no. 49/1987, p. 251. Cf., most ironi-
cally, Tanasoca, who takes an openly pro-feudal stance, denying the presumption of 
equal human worth and the principle of dignity, and preaching the moral superiority 
of aristocracy over the “common” people: A Tanasoca, Citizenship for Sale: Neome-
dieval not Just Neoliberal, “European Journal of Sociology”, no. 57/2016, p. 169. For 
a criticism, see: S. Roy, The “Streetlight Effect” in Commentary on Citizenship by Invest-
ment, in: Citizenship and Residence Sales: Rethinking the Boundaries of Belonging, eds. 
D. Kochenov, K. Surak, Cambridge 2021 (forthcoming).
24  European Parliament, Resolution of 16 January 2014 on EU citizenship for 
sale (Resolution) (2013/2995(RSP); A. Shachar, Citizenship for Sale?, in: The Oxford 
Handbook of Citizenship, eds. A. Shachar et al., Oxford 2019, p. 795; A Tanasoca, Citi-
zenship for Sale: Neomedieval Not Just Neoliberal, “European Journal of Sociology”, no. 
57/2016, p. 169; S. Carrera, The Price of EU Citizenship: The Maltese Citizenship-for-
Sale Affair and the Principle of Sincere Cooperation in Nationality Matters, “CEPS Policy 
Brief ” 2015.
25  C. Baudenbacher, “Goldene Pässe” – fragwürdige Aktionismus des EU-Kommission, 
“Neue Züricher Zeitung”, 4 Dec. 2020, p. 19.
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ment migration, as the overwhelming popularity of investment migration 
among the EU Member States testifi es. Indeed, acquiring residence and/or 
citizenship in exchange for investment or donation is a historically main-
stream practice26 conducted entirely through the law and in full compliance 
with it.27 In any event, the tone and often the content of the engagement 
of numerous of my colleague scholars and politicians with this subject is 
reminiscent of fi ghting Stanley Cohen’s “folk devils” – not mods or rock-
ers in this case, but the “sellers of citizenship”.28 There is also a facet of this 
debate which can act as a mirror – one of great importance to European so-
cieties – as investment migration unquestionably underlines citizenship’s 
absurdity,29 by allowing those who emerged as losers in the global “birth-
right lottery”30 – members of the absolute majority of the world’s popula-
tion31 – to buy what others got assigned to them for free by blood, but at 
once also to be singled out as having uniquely undeservedly acquired this 
status. When the (high) price of citizenship for the randomly unlucky is 
made clear, the hypocrisy of citizenship’s essence is instantly laid bare.32 
It therefore necessarily challenges the glorifi catory nationalist paradigm 
of contemporary citizenship regulation and citizenship studies long noted 
by Linda Bosniak and other scholars.33 This is where the Commission de-
cided to start its intervention, releasing on 23 January 2019 a Report on the 
practice of investment migration entitled “Report on Investor Citizenship 
and Residence Schemes in the European Union”.34
26  M. Prak, Citizens without Nations, Cambridge 2018.
27  E.g. P. Weingerl, M. Tratnik, Relevant Links: Investment Migration as an Ex-
pression of State Autonomy in Matters of Nationality, in: Citizenship and Residence Sales: 
Rethinking the Boundaries of Belonging, eds. D. Kochenov, K. Surak, Cambridge 2021 
(forthcoming).
28  S. Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of Mods and Rockers, Lon-
don 1972.
29  D. Kochenov, Citizenship for Real: Its Hypocrisy, Its Randomness, Its Price, in: 
Debating Transformations of National Citizenship, ed. R. Bauböck, Berlin 2018, p. 51; 
P. Spiro, Cash-for-Passports and the End of Citizenship, in: Debating Transformations of 
National Citizenship, ed. R. Bauböck, Berlin 2018, p. 17.
30  A. Shachar, The Birthright Lottery, Cambridge MA 2009.
31  D. Kochenov, Citizenship, Cambridge MA 2019; Kälin and Kochenov’s Quality of 
Nationality Index, eds. D. Kochenov, J. Lindeboom, Oxford 2020.
32  D. Kochenov, Citizenship for Real: Its Hypocrisy, Its Randomness, Its Price, in: 
Debating Transformations of National Citizenship, ed. R. Bauböck, Berlin 2018, p. 51.
33  L. Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien, Princeton 2006, pp. 5–9; and further 
J. Tully, On Global Citizenship, London 2014. See also crucially Christian Joppke’s 
work, virtually all of which could stand as an illustration of this point.
34  European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parlia-
ment, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee of the Regions 
COM(2019) 12 fi nal.
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It continued on 20 October 2020 by warning Cyprus and Malta that 
it is of the opinion that these countries are in breach of EU law as they 
grant citizenship with no regard to “genuine links”, which is purport-
edly in breach of the duty of loyalty. Disloyalty here could be to nothing 
else but the purity of European blood in one’s veins – limpieza de sangre 
21st century style. In the absence of unconditional ius soli, there is no way 
to read the Commission differently, since the whole point of “genuine 
links” can only be relevant in the case of those whose blood is presumed 
impure to provide such a link genuinely and easily in the fi rst place.35 Pu-
rity of blood money cannot buy, hence, “European citizenship should not 
be for sale” – the opening line of the Commission’s solemn moral panic 
hymn. Whether fuelling moral panics is among the tasks of the guard-
ian of the Treaties is an open question for a larger debate, directly linked 
to Europe’s justice defi cit36 and the political nature of the Commission.37 
Or is it simple Russophobia and the suspicion of the Chinese – the core 
clientele of the citizenship by investment programmes – as Baudenbacher 
suggested?38 Numerous questions arise. What we will focus on in what fol-
lows is the substance of the Commission’s legally unsound claims.
Investment Migration in the EU
As opposed to a clandestine “passport trade”, investment migration 
– which is achieved through the acquisition of citizenship by invest-
ment (CBI) or residence by investment (RBI, often eventually leading 
to citizenship) – is a completely legal practice and is widespread in the 
EU. In a world where states themselves decide on who their citizens are 
35  An American descendant of a Greek great grandfather is Greek and European, 
she unquestionably has genuine links with Greece, since the blood is pure. An Ameri-
can descendent of a Greek great grandmother, on the other hand cannot boast purity 
of blood and has no genuine links with Greece (where citizenship is passed, until 
a certain point, only via the male line) and thus no genuine links with the European 
Union either. To preserve and reinforce this core understanding is what the Commis-
sion, essentially, hopes to deploy the duty of loyalty for. Getting her the right to be 
considered a European like the fi rst American above through investment is immoral, 
we are told – but an Irish grandfather would be fi ne.
36  Cf. Europe’s Justice Defi cit?, eds. D. Kochenov, G. de Búrca, A. Williams, Ox-
ford 2015.
37  Cf. The contributions in Holding the Political Commission Accountable, ed. 
M. Dawson, Verfassungsblog debate, September 2018, https://verfassungsblog.de/
category/debates/holding-the-political-commission-accountable-debates/ (ac-
cess 1.08.2020).
38  C. Baudenbacher, “Goldene Pässe” – fragwürdige Aktionismus des EU-Kommissi-
on, “Neue Züricher Zeitung”, 4 Dec. 2020, 19.
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(1930 Hague Convention, Article 1), cashing in on rich foreigners coming 
from countries issuing low-quality citizenships is an attractive prospect.39 
It is not surprising that the rich are more than ready to pay a lot of money 
for a more dignifi ed, more useful and often less abusive status, given the 
role which citizenship plays in our lives, as Branko Milanovic, inter many 
alia, shows in his work.40 Citizenship is an effective legal tool of harsh 
arbitrary punishment and exclusion41 – and the particular mode of its ac-
quisition cannot possibly alter its essence.42
In the EU alone, direct citizenship by investment is available in Aus-
tria, Bulgaria, Cyprus (currently suspended to be reopened soon), Malta 
and potentially other Member States where naturalizations by parliament 
or the executive are exceptionally possible. As for residence, Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, 
Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania and Slovakia offer (permanent) residence sta-
tuses for investment, which are often convertible into the citizenship of 
those Member States. In short, investment migration is practiced by the 
absolute majority of the EU’s Member States. Once again, “Fortress Eu-
rope”, alongside the US, Canada, the UK, Turkey and many Caribbean 
states, is a world-leading example of this type of marketised sovereignty, 
though others abound, from Jordan to Vanuatu and Moldova. Given the 
randomness of citizenship distribution,43 opposing any particular route 
to naturalisation would be pure hypocrisy,44 just as is citizenship itself.45 
Dora Kostakopoulou is absolutely right to take issue with naturalisation’s 
very essence,46 just as Joseph Carens has done with the idea of the ethi-
cal core of citizenship and migration boundaries.47 In a world of random 
citizenship, naturalisation is inescapably a ritual which has purifying de-
fi cient “others”, thus their humiliation, at its essence.48 Ironically for the 
39  K. Surak, Millionaire Mobility and the Sale of Citizenship, “Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies”, no. 1/2021. 
40  B. Milanovic, Global Inequality, Cambridge MA 2018.
41  D. Kochenov, Citizensihp, Cambridge MA 2019.
42  Ibidem; D. Kochenov, Citizenship for Real: Its Hypocrisy, Its Randomness, Its Price, 
in: Debating Transformations of National Citizenship, ed. R. Bauböck, Berlin 2018, p. 51.
43  D. Kochenov, Citizenship, Cambridge MA 2019.
44  D. Kochenov, Citizenship for Real: Its Hypocrisy, Its Randomness, Its Price, in: 
Debating Transformations of National Citizenship, ed. R. Bauböck, Berlin 2018, p. 51.
45  Ibidem.
46  D. Kostakopoulou, Why Naturalization?, “Perspectives on European Politics 
and Society”, no. 4/2003, p. 85.
47  J. Carens, The Ethics of Immigration, Oxford 2013.
48  D. Kochenov, Mevrouw De Jong Gaat Eten: EU Citizenship and the Culture of 
Prejudice, “EUI RSCAS Working Paper”, no. 6/2011.
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moral panicking few, enabling the purchase of a citizenship, in this con-
text, is unquestionably and infi nitely more respectful of the “other” than 
the culture and language tests imposed for other naturalisation routes, 
which assume by default the defi cient nature of the newcomer’s language 
and culture.49
Naturalisations of those, who are not “natural born” citizens including 
a sub-type of investment naturalisations, fall squarely within the realm of 
what is legal worldwide, including in the EU. From Hans Ulrich Jessurun 
d’Olivera,50 Peter Spiro51 and Jo Shaw,52 to Matjaž Tratnik and Petra 
Weingerl53 and Daniel Sarmiento,54 the consensus is well articulated and 
undisputed. In the EU it is confi rmed unequivocally by the case law of 
the Court of Justice:55 from Micheletti and Zhu & Chen56 to Tjebbes.57 If 
a Member State wants an investment migration programme, it can have 
one: the division of competences is crystal clear.58 
The Commission’s 2019 Report: Pretending 
There Is No Law
On 23 January 2019, the Commission released its “Report on Inves-
tor Citizenship and Residence Schemes in the European Union”.59 The 
49  Ibidem (and the literature cited therein).
50  H.U. Jessurun d’Oliveira, op. cit.
51  P. Spiro, Nottebohm and “Genuine Link”: The Anatomy of Jurisprudential Illusion, 
“Investment Migration Research Papers”, no. 1/2019.
52  J. Shaw, Citizenship for Sale: Could and Should the EU Intervene?, in: Debating 
Transformations of National Citizenship, eds. R. Bauböck, Berlin 2018, p. 61.
53  M. Tratnik, P. Weingerl, Investment Migration and State Autonomy: The Quest for 
the Relevant Link, “Investment Migration Research Papers”, no. 4/2019.
54  D. Sarmiento, EU Competence and the Attribution of Nationality in Member States, 
“Investment Migration Research Papers”, no. 2/2019.
55  See, for the general analyses, D. Kochenov, J. Lindeboom, Pluralism Through 
its Denial, in: Research Handbook on Legal Pluralism and EU Law eds. G.T. Davies, 
M. Avbelj, Cheltenham 2018; H.U. Jessurun d’Oliveira, op. cit.
56  Case C-200/01 Zhu and Chen, ECLI:EU:C:2004:639.
57  Case C-221/17, Tjebbes, ECLI:EU:C:2018:572. Cf. D. Kochenov, The Tjebbes Fail, 
“European Papers”, no. 4/2019, p. 319; H.U. Jessurun d’Oliveira, Tjebbes en aanhangend 
nationaliteit, “Nederlands Juristenblad” 2019, p. 37; K. Swider, Legitimising Precarity of 
EU Citizenship: Tjebbes, “Common Market Law Review”, no. 57/2020, p. 1163.
58  On the specifi c issue of investment residences please see: M. van den Brink, 
Investment Residence and the Concept of Residence in EU Law: Interactions, Tensions, and 
Opportunities, “Investment Migration Research Papers”, no. 1/2017.
59  European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parlia-
ment, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee of the Regions 
COM(2019) 12 fi nal. For an insightful analysis, see: C. Margiotta, Ricchi e poveri alla 
42
Studia Europejskie – Studies in European Affairs, 1/2021
Report, containing not a single word on the benefi ts of investment migra-
tion to explain why the practice is widespread in the majority of the Mem-
ber States and saying little about the Commission’s lack of competence in 
the matter, criticised investment migration and investment citizenship in 
particular, on totally unsubstantiated grounds, misrepresenting the law 
of the EU as well as international law and coming to questionable con-
clusions in direct confl ict with the case law of the Court of Justice. The 
Report is thus a puzzling example of a political document produced not 
only in oblivion of, but in direct contradiction to the law.
Given the ongoing moral panic and the resultant emotive and negative 
attention that the whole issue of investment citizenship and residence 
has been receiving from the powers that be in the European Union – be it 
the European Parliament60 or the individual Commissioners, from Red-
ing’s “EU citizenship should not be for sale”61 from several years ago, 
to Commissioner Jourová’s more recent proclamations62 – lawyers and 
policymakers could justifi ably have expected much more from the Com-
mission’s treatment of this much infl ated but hugely important topic. 
Though substantially fewer than 1% of all citizenships and residences 
granted in the EU are investment-based – a fact, which the Commission 
never mentions, strongly indicating that the weight given to the issue is 
most likely infl ated – its characterisation as being of overwhelming eco-
nomic and social importance clearly indicates that it deserves very serious 
and clear-eyed analysis. The Commission’s Report fails abundantly on 
this count and the reasons – beyond banal political bias, overshadowing 
even EU law – are diffi cult to formulate.
The Report, which is clearly a result of a huge log-rolling exercise, will 
defi nitely not be entered on the roll of documents the Commission could 
even be vaguely proud of. Rather than providing a clear, rule-based analy-
sis of the forces underlying the moral panic behind offering “for sale” the 
sacred status of belonging, the Report turns against the key achievements 
of the Union and misrepresents EU citizenship law as a nineteenth-cen-
tury Blut und Boden myth, rather than a modern, globalised, forward-
looking status. The Union emerging from the pages of the Report is noth-
prova della cittadinanza europea. Annotazioni sulla Relazione della Commissione europea 
sui programmi di cittadinanza per investitori, “Ragion Pratica”, no. 2/2020, p. 513.
60  European Parliament, Resolution of 16 January 2014 on EU citizenship for sale 
(2013/2995RSP).
61  V. Reding, Citizenship Must Not be Up for Sale, European Commission Speech 14/18, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-18_en.htm (access 1.08.2020).
62  E.g. Answer of Commissioner Jourová on behalf of the Commission on written 
question, E-005960/2017.
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ing short of Hamsunian, full of “nature”, “genuine links” and “real” citi-
zenships, based on long-dead, repugnant ideals and thus impossibly dull. 
Given that there is no legal basis in the TEU or TFEU for the pursuit 
of a “natural” citizenship myth as it once was – as discussed by Spiro,63 
Joppke64 and others, it does not come as a surprise that the Commission 
resorts to obsolete legal authority and abundant, fl awed legal reasoning to 
sell the untenable position that it has no legal basis properly to defend. 
One wonders why the legal service did not get a chance to see the docu-
ment in draft: the Commission’s position, in assuming “genuine links” 
between states and citizens, is not only fl awed in terms of international 
law – as will be discussed below – but it also falls short of the “market citi-
zenship” standard, however criticized.65 If conditioned on such “genuine 
links”, free movement of EU citizens would be endangered, if not impos-
sible, which is precisely the reason why AG Tesauro laughed at the embar-
rassing position embraced by the Commission in the ancient Micheletti 
case.66
The Report is correct on many of the facts it communicates: 20 or 
more (i.e., more than 70%) Member States opted for a policy which the 
Commission has no direct competence to regulate,67 but tackles in the 
Report. This alone makes the Commission’s take on investment mi-
gration worth looking at in some detail: what is on the Commission’s 
mind? The analysis that the Commission provides is fl awed on at least 
fi ve levels, briefl y dealt with below. The outcomes are instructive: as the 
Member States have largely ignored this pas by the Commission, the 
institution has been toning down its most absurd claims in the months 
that followed the Report’s release, as Luuk van der Baaren reports.68 This 
toning down phase proved to be short-lived, however, as the moral panic 
report parading as law provided the foundation of the 20 October 2020 
63  P. Spiro, Cash-for-Passports…, op. cit., p. 17.
64  C. Joppke, Citizenship and Immigration, Cambridge 2010; C. Joppke, The Instru-
mental Turn of Citizenship, “Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies”, no. 44/2018, p. 1.
65  See, for the best available analysis: C. O’Brien, Unity in Adversity, Oxford 2017. 
See also D. Kochenov, The Oxymoron of “Market Citizenship” and the Future of the Eu-
ropean Union, in: The Internal Market and the Future of European Integration: Essays in 
Honour of Laurence W. Gormley, ed. F. Amtenbrink et al., Cambridge 2019, p. 217 (and 
the literature cited therein).
66  Opinion of AG Tesauro in Case C-369/90 Micheletti [1992] ECR I-4239, para 5.
67  D. Sarmiento, EU Competence and the Attribution of Nationality in Member States, 
“Investment Migration Research Paper”, no. 2/2019.
68  L. van der Baaren, Investor Citizenship and State Sovereignty in International Law, 
in: Citizenship and Residence Sales: Rethinking the Boundaries of Belonging, eds. D. Ko-
chenov, K. Surak, Cambridge 2021 (forthcoming).
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action by the Commission against two of the smallest Member States 
among dozens practicing investment migration. All the fl aws found in 
the Report and dissected below thus left the realm of relatively abstract 
scribbles and are being turned by the Commission into the tools to bully 
the smallest Member States. The bullying tools are referred to as such 
here simply because what the Commission lists are not legal arguments. 
Worse still, should these be legal arguments, a successful operation of 
EU citizenship and the fundamental principle of non-discrimination on 
the basis of nationality in the internal market would need to be set aside 
in favour of high nationalism ideals where blood is “pure” and citizen-
ship is “natural”.
Flaw no. 1: Framing investment uniquely as a risk, 
rather than an opportunity
Undoubtedly, there is a fundamentally important issue to hand: in-
vestment migration is capable of bringing huge gains, but also brings 
with it potential risks. The Commission is dead silent on the former, pre-
sumably deferring to the over 70% of the Member States on this crucial 
issue, but is absolutely right about mentioning the latter. When practiced 
in non-transparent and corrupt ways, investment migration – like any 
other enterprise – will certainly generate problems that have to be tack-
led. These precisely involve corruption, money laundering and tax eva-
sion – not naturalisation as such. The Commission’s Report fails to make 
this basic distinction. On this count, banking, mining or gambling – to 
name but a few corruptible enterprises – could be frowned upon – yet 
when we regulate banks, casinos or mines, we do not presume that these 
activities should be outlawed; precisely the presumption the Commission 
harbours in the Report on investment migration and pushes in its action 
against Cyprus and Malta. It presents the whole issue of investment mi-
gration uniquely as a risk, rather than as an opportunity. In particular, the 
Commission speaks of the risks regarding “security, money-laundering, 
tax evasion and corruption”.69
The fact that twenty Member States offer residence, residence leading 
to citizenship or citizenship directly, for donations or investments, as the 
69  Commission’s Report, p. 2. Crucially, research shows that unlike reversing the 
key EU citizenship law of the ECJ, which the Commission hints at in the report when 
invoking “genuine links”, it has full competence to address money laundering, tax 
evasion, corruption threats and other issues usually mentioned in the context of the 
moral panics surrounding investment migration: D. Sarmiento, M. van den Brink, 
EU Competence and Investor Migration, in: Citizenship and Residence Sales: Rethinking the 
Boundaries of Belonging, eds. D. Kochenov, K. Surak, Cambridge 2021 (forthcoming).
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Commission correctly reports, makes it clear that the cost and benefi t 
analysis has been conducted differently by at least twenty governments 
which have opted to introduce the schemes with the benefi ts to be reaped 
in mind.70 This makes the Commission’s complete silence on the poten-
tial benefi ts of such schemes in terms of investment very problematic. 
It is certainly a fi eld worth studying. It could defi nitely be the case that 
there is no fl ow of FDI triggered specifi cally by an investment migra-
tion scheme in certain countries. Sumption and Hooper have shown,71 for 
instance, that UK Tier 1 visas – incidentally, like the one revoked from 
Roman Abramovich and leading to the loss of inter alia a billion pounds 
of investment into a new stadium – a visa type which formally requires 
the purchase of government bonds, do not affect the country’s economic 
performance. This statement cannot be true for all the twenty jurisdic-
tions, however. Consider applying this analysis to countries requiring 
a donation, such as Malta, rather than an investment, with its expected 
return. While in Cyprus, for instance, it could indeed be the case – how-
ever doubtful the hypothesis – that for some reason, even more Russian 
or Chinese money would have passed through the island’s banks without 
it having citizenships on offer, in the case of Malta it is absolutely clear 
that the contributions, which are paid in exchange for citizenship, would 
not under any circumstances whatsoever, have been made without the 
Malta Individual Investment Programme offering the service for which 
the money is paid.
To put it differently, what the Commission chose not to mention or 
quantify is a share of Malta’s GDP and the results of the analyses con-
ducted by the twenty Member States of the EU which underpinned their 
respective decisions to introduce investment migration programmes in 
national law. In other words, the complete silence concerning the benefi ts 
which the overwhelming majority of the EU Member States either receive 
or believe to be receiving from investment migration, unquestionably 
casts the Commission’s work in a deeply biased light. The Commission’s 
suggestion seems to be that twenty Member States are all behaving deeply 
irrationally, which is implausible and thus absurd on its face. Without 
denying the potential risks, which are rightly pointed out by the Com-
mission, it is nevertheless possible to assert that the aim of the Report is 
70  This being said, what amounts to a “success” of an investment migration pro-
gramme is, of course, a complex and multi-faceted issue: M. Sumption, Can Investor 
Residence and Citizenship Programmes Be a Policy Success?, in: Citizenship and Residence 
Sales: Rethinking the Boundaries of Belonging, eds. D. Kochenov, K. Surak, Cambridge 
2021 (forthcoming).
71  M. Sumption, K. Hooper, op. cit.
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the misrepresentation of investment migration, given that, notwithstand-
ing the fact that the title of the Report mentions citizenship and investor 
residence schemes, it is entirely silent, precisely, on the raison d’être of 
both – investments – something that should have rather been the starting 
point of any serious analysis. This is the fi rst count on which the Com-
mission has failed.
Flaw no. 2: An incompetent hymn to blood and soil
The Commission claims to have discovered what citizenship is about, 
writing that citizenship “is traditionally based on […] ius sanguinis and 
[…] ius soli”.72 This is all correct, but the Devil, as is only so frequently 
the case, is in the details. In giving its “golden standard”, the Commission 
does not make it clear that: 
a)  it does not have the power to regulate this area; 
b)  the reality is much more complex than what its selective summary 
purports to demonstrate. 
The combination of the two is extremely problematic, befogging the 
crucial issue of citizenship acquisition rules to a great degree and ena-
bling the Commission to squeeze in several bizarre, legally obscurantist 
claims into the text of the Report only for these to reappear in the context 
of probing the legal action against two of the smallest Member States.
Referring to citizenship by investment, the Commission writes that, in 
essence, such “citizenship is granted under less stringent conditions than 
under ordinary naturalization regimes”.73 What is crucial here is to men-
tion the different ways that the citizenship law of all the Member States 
rationally accommodate enabling the acquisition of citizenship by differ-
ent categories of applicants. Also of importance is the sovereignty/compe-
tence aspect of this story. Starting with the latter, states are free to confer 
citizenship on those whom they consider qualifi ed under the Hague Con-
vention of Nationality (Article 1) and, unquestionably, under EU law – as 
Shaw,74 myself75 and most recently, Jessurun d’Oliveira,76 Sarmiento77 and 
72  Commission’s Report, p. 3.
73  Ibidem, p. 2 (emphasis added).
74  J. Shaw, Citizenship for Sale: Could and Should the EU Intervene?, in: Debating 
Transformations of National Citizenship, ed. R. Bauböck, Berlin 2018, p. 61. 
75  D. Kochenov, Rounding up the Circle: The Mutation of Member States Nationalities 
under Pressure from EU Citizenship, “EUI RSCAS Working Paper”, no. 23/2010. 
76  H.U. Jessurun d’Oliveira, op. cit.
77  D. Sarmiento, EU Competence and the Attribution of Nationality in Member States, 
“Investment Migration Research Papers”, no. 2/2019.
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Tratnik and Weingerl78 have demonstrated. By extension, this applies to 
EU citizenship, which is a derivative – ius tractum – citizenship.79 No sane 
academic voice would be able to argue that the EU has competence to 
legislate here, which is why the Report is not a legislative proposal and 
will never become one. It will not surprise the reader to learn that France 
still decides on who is French and retains all the rights to do so, just as 
Malta decides on who is Maltese and Finland on who is Finnish. The law 
is crystal-clear, just like the fact that all the Member States fi nd the con-
tinuation of this approach vital to their interests – which makes the Com-
mission’s Report look like a poorly orchestrated attempted power-grab. It 
is impossible to propose the rigid framework that the Report purports to 
have found (ius sanguinis + ius soli + “genuine links”) for establishing any 
mode of acquisition of citizenship, in an area where the Commission has 
no say in law, but the aspiration is clear. To present Malta, Cyprus or Bul-
garia as breaching the fundamental principles of EU law would have been 
going too far: they use their legal competence to naturalise third-country 
nationals in strict accordance with the law. This is exactly why the Com-
mission merely uses a negative tone to refer to these activities, instead of 
explaining what is wrong with them. The answer is: nothing is wrong 
and the tone is unacceptable. Consequently, the reasons for mentioning 
that “these schemes are explicitly advertised as a means of acquiring EU 
citizenship”80 are unclear, since the schemes are precisely created to make 
new EU citizens – nothing more and nothing less.
EU law is funny in a way – and this is its unquestionable, pluralist 
strength.81 A US kid able to fi nd a Greek great-great-grandfather can 
become an EU citizen automatically without ever visiting Greece; the 
spouse of a Frenchman in Vietnam can naturalise without ever having 
lived in France or Europe, an EU citizen does not need to renounce her 
original nationality when naturalising in Germany, unlike any Turk or 
a Russian with no EU citizenship, and a Catholic dignitary retiring from 
the Vatican becomes an Italian automatically and immediately, all of them 
not under “less stringent conditions”, but because these are groups treat-
ed differently by immigration and citizenship law in the Member States 
concerned.
78  M. Tratnik, P. Weingerl, Investment Migration and State Autonomy: The Quest for 
the Relevant Link, “Investment Migration Research Papers”, no. 4/2019.
79  D. Kochenov, Ius Tractum of Many Faces: European Citizenship and the Diffi -
cult Relationship between Status and Rights, “Columbia Journal of European Law”, no. 
15/2009, p. 169. 
80  Commission’s Report, p. 2.
81  D. Kochenov, J. Lindeboom, Pluralism Through its…, op. cit.
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Perusal of any citizenship law book makes as much clear: when we 
speak about the acquisition of citizenship, differentiated treatment of dif-
ferent cases is key. It is an essential and characteristic part of nationality 
regulation. Member States establish what is desirable and while Italy has 
decided that asking an ailing Japanese Cardinal – stateless upon retire-
ment from Vatican service – to wait the usual 10 years to become Italian is 
undesirable, replacing it with zero years instead, and the Dutch govern-
ment has decided that asking asylum seekers to wait as long as others to 
naturalise would be unkind, the Maltese government makes the grant of 
nationality conditional on a signifi cant donation to drive the economy 
of the island. In the light of the existing differences in procedure, under-
pinned by great disproportion in the numbers, where hundreds of thou-
sands became EU citizens through extremely remote ancestry or other 
ways having nothing to do with the state or its “culture” through the laws 
of Bulgaria, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Romania and other states, stating that 
investment citizenship is ‘less stringent’, as the Commission does, is an 
absurd misrepresentation.
To drive this point home, it is even more absurd than it fi rst seems 
at least for two reasons. Most importantly, all other ways to acquire citi-
zenship do not require a signifi cant investment. An American kid, like 
the son of a Venezuelan friend, searching through archives for any Greek 
connections so as to avoid paying US-rate tuition fees at Bologna Medical 
School, is not bringing several million to Greece. To imply that undy-
ing Greekness can persist across six generations, however much ethno-
nationalist and passé a notion this might be, is a decision for the Greek 
government to take, which fi ts the general international trends, as Chris-
tian Joppke has shown.82 
So the Cypriot choice to create citizens through investment is at least 
as rational (or irrational) as the Greek, but not to a protestor in the “Mac-
edonia is Greece” crowds of course,83 which our US kid, thankfully, will 
never join. The question of what is “legal” does not arise, since it is not 
up to the Commission to ask or comment on and given that international 
law, just like European law, is clear: Member States will decide as they 
see fi t. So for Malta EUR 650,000 was more important than nationalism, 
while for Greece the opposite is true. Some would applaud this choice: 
82  C. Joppke, Citizenship between De- and Re-Ethnicization, “European Journal of 
Sociology”, no. 44/2003, p. 429.
83  Z. Rahim, Athens riots: Clashes as 60,000 protesters march in Greece against Mace-
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“Greek blood is important!” To suggest, however, that some other choice 
is somehow “less legal” cannot be correct. And morality has never played 
a role in citizenship law, especially in the EU, with its colonial past84 and 
essentially race-based exclusion from EU citizenship85 approved by the 
ECJ in Kaur.86 Globally the picture is no different: citizenship is the main 
tool for the preservation of global inequality at the moment, as Branko 
Milanovic, once again, has explained.87 
Secondly, and equally importantly, “ordinary conditions” – as op-
posed to the frowned-upon “less stringent” ones – imply a level of due 
diligence which is signifi cantly lower than what investment citizenship 
promises: the entirety of one’s fi nances and business connections, as well 
as your entire life history would not normally be dug up by independent 
due diligence providers, unless you are an investor naturalising on that 
ground.88
This is only right: different applicants require different standards. 
The absurdity of implying, as the Commission does, that investing 
several million and going through deep scrutiny is less stringent than 
fi nding a Greek man whom you have never met in one’s ancestry (citi-
zenship has traditionally been sexist, of course),89 speaks for itself. 
This begs the conclusion that the ‘context’ of citizenship acquisition, 
to which the Commission dedicated a whole section in its Report,90 
is misleading: forgetting to mention “difference” amounts to failing 
to tell a true story. The Commission has thus failed at the most basic 
level, and is unable to present the fundamental rules for the acquisition 
citizenship.
84  P. Hansen, S. Jonsson, Eurafrica: The Untold Story of European Integration and 
Colonialism, London 2014.
85  Lord A. Lester, Thirty Years on: The East African Case Revisited, “Public Law”, 
no. 47/2002, p. 52.
86  Case C-192/99 Kaur [2001] ECR I-01237; H. Toner, Annotation Case C-192/99 
Kaur [2001], “Common Market Law Review”, no. 39/2002, p. 881. Cf. D. Koche-
nov, Ius Tractum of Many Faces, “Columbia Journal of European Law”, no. 15/2009, 
p. 169.
87  B. Milanovic, Global Inequality, Cambridge MA 2016.
88  M. Corrado, K. Marsh, Investment Migration and the Importance of Due Diligence: 
Examples of Canada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and the EU, in: Citizenship and Residence 
Sales: Rethinking the Boundaries of Belonging, eds. D. Kochenov, K. Surak, Cambridge 
2021 (forthcoming).
89  J. Abrams, Examining Entrenched Masculinities in the Republican Government 
Tradition, “West Virginia Law Review”, no. 114/2011, p. 165.
90  Commission’s Report, Section 2.1, pp. 3, 4.
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Flaw no. 3: Flawed reasoning rooted in obsolete authority 
of ‘genuine links’
The third main fl aw of the Report after misrepresenting the investment 
migration it purports to describe and failing to summarise the basics of 
citizenship acquisition rules, is the Commission’s failure to come to terms 
with the basic meaning of citizenship in law as an abstract legal status. 
Rogers Brubaker famously defi nes citizenship as an “object and instru-
ment of closure”,91 that is: selecting those who “belong” from the avail-
able number of bodies and guarding the selected few from those who do 
not “belong”. It means that not caring about the county and its purported 
“values” will not make you less of a citizen in the eyes of the law, just as 
caring a lot about some offi cially endorsed “culture” or language will not 
make you a citizen, unless you are named as such by law. Pretending that 
this is not the case – and many countries go to absurd lengths with this 
– like my own Kingdom92 – is deeply unhelpful. It is, nevertheless, what 
citizenship is designed to do – presented to us as “natural” a legal status 
which deprives those not endowed with it of any voice, discarding their 
dignity in the majority of cases, and which shields those who proudly and 
offi cially “belong” of any trifl ing criticism from the status quo. When 
the Commission informs us that “the study looked at other factors […] 
which might arguably create a link between the applicant for citizenship 
and the country concerned”,93 a citizenship lawyer reading it might well 
be puzzled. It is fundamental to realise that only citizenship can be such 
a link. To present citizenship – an abstract legal status – as something that 
requires more than itself in order to be enjoyed is not faithful to the letter 
and the spirit of global citizenship law as it stands today. The Commis-
sion’s analysis carries with it a whiff of the totalitarianism of nineteenth 
century approaches to allegiance.94
It is impossible, with recourse to the law in force, to justify the Com-
mission’s position, since it would mean that all that the EU stands for: 
liberal values, non-discrimination on the basis of nationality, human dig-
nity and equality, can be undone on the basis of tired and unambiguous 
91  R. Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, Cambridge MA 
1992.
92  D. Kochenov, Mevrouw De Jong Gaat Eten: EU Citizenship and the Culture of 
Prejudice, “EUI RSCAS Working Paper”, no. 6/2011. Please note that the situation 
has become much worse since the paper has been written, as the level of absurdity 
and humiliation to which those willing to get the local documents are subjected has 
risen sharply.
93  Commission’s Report, p. 5.
94  Cf. D. Kochenov, Citizenship, Cambridge MA 2019.
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nationalist tropes such as “links” with states and “cultures” pre-approved 
by the powers that be. The whole point of the text of the Report which 
emerges is the Commission’s apparent desire to play handmaiden to such 
a totalitarianism: is this Maltese a “real” Maltese? What if he has never 
visited the European Union? And what about this Irishwoman?95 And 
this Brit?96 This Dutch?97 This is where the obsolete case law of the Inter-
national Court of Justice (!) – expressly overruled by the EU’s own Court of 
Justice – comes into play: the Commission refers quite extensively to the 
Nottebohm theory of “genuine links”.98 
It could of course be possible that the Commission’s desk offi cers 
might be unaware of the fact that the case was opposed immediately after 
it was decided by Jones, Kunz, Panhuys, and Weis – the list of authorities 
could be continued ad infi nitum – and later dismissed by René de Groot, 
Jessurun d’Olivera, Macklin, Sloane, Thwaites, Vermeer-Kunzli and 
many others, as Spiro has splendidly summarised.99 What they could not 
overlook, however, is that “genuine links” are incompatible with a world 
which has moved on, at least offi cially, from perpetual allegiance and 
glorious mystifi cations of blood nationalism, as the Court of Justice con-
fi rmed in Micheletti.100 As per Advocate General Tesauro, the “romantic 
period of international relations”101 is over. It is thus quite unacceptable, 
95  Case C-434/09 McCarthy v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] ECR 
I- 3375.
96  Case C-192/99 Kaur [2001] ECR I-1237.
97  C-221/17, Tjebbes and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2019:189; D. Kochenov, The Tjeb-
bes..., op. cit., p. 319; K. Swider, op. cit., p. 1163. 
98  Nottebohm (Judgment) [1955] ICJ Rep 4. The citizenship of Lichtenstein held 
by Mr Nottebohm was not recognised by Guatemala, the latter state treating Mr Not-
tebohm as a German citizen – a status he did not hold. The ICJ agreed with this 
restrictive vision, ruling that nationality is a “legal bond having as its basis a social 
fact of attachment, a genuine connection of experience, interests and sentiments, to-
gether with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties”. The ICJ failed to mention, 
however, that in the absence of any other nationality but that of Liechtenstein and 
with “genuine link” only to Guatemala, precisely the state aggressing him, Mr Not-
tebohm was deprived of any remedy as a result of the controversial decision, even if 
limited only to the recognition of nationality for the purposes of diplomatic protec-
tion. To see the incoherence of the judgement, see the Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Klaestad and the dissenting opinion of Judge Read. For analysis see the literature 
recommended in A. Bleckmann, The Personal Jurisdiction of the European Community, 
“Common Market Law Review” no. 17/1980, pp. 467, 477 and note 16.
99  P. Spiro, Nottebohm and “Genuine Link…, op. cit. Please see the extensive litera-
ture cited therein.
100  Case C-369/90 Micheletti [1992] ECR I-4239, I-4262.
101  Opinion of AG Tesauro in Case C-369/90 Micheletti [1992] ECR I-4239, 
I-4262.
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in the respectful opinion of this author, to provide a reference to “genuine 
links” and Nottebohm in an offi cial Report of the European Commission 
as a reference to the necessity to have nationality acquired by naturalisa-
tion recognized in the “international arena”.102 The reference is fl awed, 
since the Court of Justice of the European Union has expressly prohibited 
the Member States from relying on Nottebohm in dealing with each other’s 
nationals. The Report contradicts itself, of course, since this fact is men-
tioned in footnote 30.103 You cannot have a rule of recognition “in the 
international arena”, which is at the same time expressly prohibited by 
the highest EU Court, with the immediate effect, of course, of blocking 
Nottebohm in the territory of the EU. This point is absolutely crucial: the 
Commission’s Report knowingly misrepresents EU law.
References to the obsolete authority only start the Commission’s puz-
zling campaign of putting legal reasoning to sleep. The Report essentially 
claims that since checking “genuine links” is expressly prohibited by EU 
law in Micheletti (again, mentioned correctly in a footnote),104 Member 
States have to ensure that such links exist.105 A prohibition is turned into 
an implied obligation. In outlawing any such links in Micheletti the Court 
of Justice has apparently instructed someone – in the mind of the Com-
mission – to check whether the “genuine links” are there. This could 
not be further from the truth. Quite to the contrary, the Court has in fact 
clarifi ed that “genuine links” do not apply in the context of the EU and 
that Nottebohm is bad law: the desk offi cers should check a textbook (any 
from this millennium would do). It is settled case law that no residence 
in any Member State is required in order for EU citizens to use the free 
movement rights protected by EU law. The Commission is trying, in its 
Report, to use precisely the prohibition against checking ‘genuine links’ 
unequivocally expressed directly by the Court of Justice itself as a pretext 
to imply that there is an obligation to check the existence of such links, 
presumably on the quiet. Harry Frankfurt’s “On Bullshit”106 is at least 
only a philosophical joke, even though not more than mildly entertain-
ing, while the Commission’s text purports to be a serious effort aimed at 
informing policy decisions. Nottebohm is unquestionably bad law and the 
Commission was obliged to know this to be the case. The Commission’s 
reasoning amounts to trying to undermine the internal market, estab-
lished case law on the free movement of persons, and the rule of EU law 
102  Commission’s Report, pp. 5, 6.
103  Ibidem, p. 7.
104  Ibidem, p. 6.
105  Ibidem.
106  H. Frankfurt, On Bullshit, Princeton 2005.
53
D.V. Kochenov, Commission’s Assault on Citizenship by Investment
established in Micheletti. The Commission thus knowingly attempts to 
mislead the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions, to whom the Re-
port is addressed, for political reasons. It could even be regarded as an 
example of the violation of the duty of loyalty, were the Report more 
convincing.107
Flaw no. 4: Curious assumptions about the connection 
between residence, citizenship, and security
It is when looking for possible solutions to the risks identifi ed in terms 
of security, tax evasion and money laundering, however, that the Report 
reaches the level of the truly esoteric, which becomes scary, rather than 
entertaining. The Commission’s analysis seems to be based on the as-
sumption, which is nowhere explained or defended properly, that pres-
ence in one of the Member States for a period of time before naturalisa-
tion is likely to alleviate the security risks posed by a naturalised person. 
It is impossible to make a convincing argument that going through the 
one particular naturalisation procedure the Commission might have in 
mind makes one a less dangerous person. In fact, for as long as newly cre-
ated Maltese billionaires do not stab people at Christmas markets or ram 
vans into crowds, the assumption entertained by the Commission rests 
unproven.
This also undermines the appeal of the Commission’s fi ndings that 
“this means that applicants can acquire citizenship of Bulgaria, Cyprus or 
Malta – and hence EU citizenship – without ever having resided in prac-
tice in the Member State”.108 The only answer to this is “of course!” in 
a situation where hundreds of thousands of EU citizens have never been 
to the EU in their lives and there is no legal requirement, either in the 
EU or in International law, to bother to visit one’s country of citizenship. 
Indeed, not everyone is fond of their grandparents’ graves. Even moving 
beyond this obvious reality is ground well-known to the Commission: 
EU citizenship does not have independent grounds of acquisition. This 
means that – just as with the Greek, Irish or French citizenship that it 
would be derived from – it is entirely incorrect to imply that it requires 
any residence anywhere in particular. What it requires in fact, is the ob-
servance of the law – French, Irish, or Cypriot – democratically passed by 
107  The duty of loyalty does not only apply to the Member States, but is owed 
equally by the Commission to the EU and other organs and institutions. Cf. e.g. 
M. Klamert, The Principle of Loyalty in EU Law, Oxford 2014.
108  Commission’s Report, p. 5.
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the relevant Parliament. Moreover, the continued possession of citizen-
ship is not dependent, unlike the global practice until half a century ago, 
on residence in any particular territory.109 EU citizens born in Chicago 
with this status will remain EU citizens even if they never visit the EU. 
If they do, no due diligence or security checks will be conducted to as-
certain their right to retain their citizenship, of course. This is the most 
basic context in which all citizenships in the world operate: citizenship 
does not require residence and residence does not mean that someone is 
somehow rendered less of a threat. The Commission’s fl awed analysis is 
thus consistent throughout in its absolute ignorance of the subject matter 
of the Report that the institution has published.
Flaw no. 5: Other important misrepresentations of EU Law
Lastly – throughout the Report the Commission underlines the risks 
related to the freedom of movement between the Member States of these 
new citizens after their naturalisation. There is a problem here. Framing 
the use of the most important right of citizenship under EU law uniquely 
as a risk is not entirely correct. What could be mentioned – following 
Christian Kälin110 – is that all the individuals naturalised through citi-
zenship by investment are in fact ideal EU citizens in the light of Direc-
tive 2004/38: they will never be a burden on the social security systems 
of the host Member States and will obviously have comprehensive health 
insurance – the two core requirements to be met in order to benefi t from 
the free movement right under Article 21 TFEU. Also the Report’s word-
ing about “circumventing certain nationality requirements”111 is unhelp-
ful and is no doubt a misunderstanding: naturalisation by investment 
makes one a citizen of Malta, i.e. it is a vehicle for meeting the requirement 
of nationality, not circumventing it. Becoming a citizen – either through 
marriage to a Dutch lady or serving in the French foreign legion or retir-
ing from the Vatican – cannot be equated with circumventing a require-
ment of nationality. Most worryingly, the Commission seems to hint at 
109  This being said, possessing two or more nationalities can suddenly activate 
this old rule to punish multiple citizens for being themselves, something that the 
Court of Justice is absolutely fi ne with, as Tjebbes has demonstrated: D. Kochenov, 
The Tjebbes..., op. cit., p. 319. For an analysis of the possible broader negative impli-
cations of holding multiple nationalities in the context of EU law, see: D.A.J.G. de 
Groot, Free Movement of Dual EU Citizens, in: European Citizenship under Stress: Social 
Justice, Brexit, and Other Challenges, eds. N. Cambien, D. Kochenov, E. Muir, Boston 
2020.
110  C. Kälin, op. cit. 
111  Commission’s Report, p. 17.
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discrimination on the basis of how citizenship was acquired, which is 
prohibited in EU law since the Boukhalfa case law,112 which it does not 
cite, not to mention the European Convention on Nationality, on which 
it is equally silent.
Leaving Boukhalfa aside, the Commission has had problems brushing 
up on its knowledge of Directive 2003/109 as well, it appears, as several 
Member States are implicitly criticised for establishing an easier way 
to access their national Permanent Residence than the requirement of 
that Directive provides.113 This criticism is unacceptable, since Directive 
2003/109 states unequivocally in Article 13 that: “Member States may 
issue residence permits of permanent or unlimited validity on terms that 
are more favourable than those laid down by this Directive” (emphasis 
added). To be absolutely clear: to imply that the Directive establishes 
the minimum threshold for defi ning permanent residence in the EU – as 
Sergio Carrera quite embarrassingly has done114 – is absolutely incorrect, 
since the text of the provision above is quite clear. It is of course true 
that national requirements, which are more lenient that those set out 
in Directive 2003/109 will not produce EU-level rights for the holders 
of these permits, a point covered in the literature by Martijn van den 
Brink,115 but this is not the general point the Report seems to be making. 
The Report is taking issue, erroneously, with the low physical presence 
thresholds under national legislation on investment residence in Malta, 
Greece and Bulgaria. Once again: this criticism is moot, since the Direc-
tive expressly allows the Member States to set the presence requirement 
at zero (“0”) days. This is the law the Commission is there to respect, up-
hold and promote. In fact, it is unclear why it is criticising the decisions 
legitimately taken by three Member State governments clearly within 
their realm of competence and breaching no legal rules while showing 
no evidence whatsoever of any abuse of the law besides its own relentless 
ignorance.
112  Case C-214/94 Boukhalfa ECLI:EU:C:1996:174. Although the Report recog-
nises the importance of non-discrimination on this ground, it is written based on the 
presumption of the necessity to discriminate, which follows from its questionable 
‘genuine links’ logic in the context of granting nationalities acquired by naturalisa-
tion an effect. Under this approach, outlawed by the Court of Justice, Miss Boukhalfa 
could have had no genuine links with Germany to allow her to be protected from 
discrimination. 
113  Commission’s Report, pp. 8, 9.
114  S. Carrera, op. cit., p. 18.
115  M. van den Brink, Investment Residence and…, op. cit.
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Conclusion: Berlaymont is Taking us for a Ride
The Commission has proven Harry Frankfurt right: “One of the most 
salient features of our culture is that there is so much bullshit”.116 It has 
taken us for a ride, nineteenth century style, telling twenty Member States 
that they are most likely doing it wrong, while enjoying no competence to 
regulate the fi eld and demonstrating rather poor command of the matter 
in question. There are excellent lawyers at the Commission and the mat-
ter of “genuine links” belongs to the dullest footnotes of old textbooks, 
which point in one direction: the Commission’s decision to misrepresent 
the law and go against the non-discrimination essence of EU citizenship 
to attempt to enlarge own Competences is but a dangerous political game. 
On 20 October 2020 the Commission started to push even harder, by wav-
ing threats to go to Court in a case it knows is a fl op.
Many will no doubt be surprised by this – is this really what the 
Commission is for? – while Blood and Soil communitarians of all sorts 
will cheer. Beyond the haphazard argumentation and wilful misinfor-
mation concerning citizenship in general and EU citizenship in partic-
ular, the Report, just as the 20 October 2020 press release sends a very 
clear message: the Commission wants to regulate citizenship, telling 
France who is a Frenchmen and Estonians who has “genuine links” 
to Estonia. It is quite offensive of course, given the values the Union 
stands for, and not merely disappointing, that the Commission could 
believe in “genuine links”, and express itself to be ready to sacrifi ce the 
core principles that the EU is based on. Yet, the Commission might 
be wrong thinking that it is too big and powerful next to Cyprus and 
Malta to be worried about losing face over a trivial matter of who might 
properly be regarded as European and who is owed dignity and respect 
in the EU. In the Union priding itself as an embodiment of integration 
through law pretending that the law does not exist or matter only to 
further the political interests underpinning a moral panic is a game 
which is much more dangerous than it would seem at the fi rst glance. 
EU citizenship is as valuable as it is fragile and interpreting it in the 
despicable Blut und Boden way of “genuine links”, i.e. by denying its 
bearers human dignity, will kill it.
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